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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
ETHA BAKER FLOWERS, AURA BAKER
HORTON, and TULlE BAKI<JR RANDALL,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
WRIGHTS, INCORPORATED,
A Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEMENT OF CASE
This case involves simply a determination of the
meaning of certain language embodied in a written lease
between plaintiff's predecessor (their mother) as lessor,
and the defendant, as lessee. If the language means as
contended for by defendant, then the defendant admittedly has paid all of the rentals owing by it, except
as to the amount of $211.80, which has heretofore been
tendered and refused. On the other hand, if the language means as contended by plaintiff, defendant may
owe additional rentals. We use the word "may" advisedly, as there are other factors that then enter into
the determination, and which will hereinafter be discussed.

The lease in question was executed by plai11tiffH'
mother, Allie C. Baker, as lessor, and the defendant, as
lessee, on or about February 11, 1939, for a five year
term commencing February 15, 1939. Defendant hn<l
occupied the premises for some time prior to the execution of this formal lease. (Tr. 10) On June 23, 1941,
the term of the then existing lease was extewled to
February 15, 1949.
The important language of the lease, insofar as
this case is concerned, is, except possibly for one matter,
set out in plaintiff's brief. We here again set it out for
convenience in referring to it.
At the very beginning of the lease the parties are
positively identified-Allie C. Baker (plaintiffs' predecessor), as the "Lessor", and Wrights, Incorporated,
as the "Lessee".
The lease then provides :
''And said lessee, in consideration of the leasing of the premises aforesaid by said lessor to it,
covenants to pay as the annual rental for said
premises three (3) per cent of the total sales
volume of the lessee, provided, however, that the
lessee agrees to pay a minimum rental of Two
Thousand Niue Hundred and Forty Dollars
($2,940.00) per year, payable in monthly installments * * *."
"It is understood and agreed that the books of
said lessee shall be open for inspection to verify
the annual sales reported by it". (Italics added).
Section 3 of the lease then provides :
"That neither the lessee nor its legal representatives will let or underlet said premises, or
2

assign this lease, without the written assent of the
lessor first had and obtained thereto, except that
said lessee may sublet space in the said premises
to dPpartmeuts selling other lines of merchandise
than those offered for sale by the lessee, that is
to say, women's coats, suits, furs and dresses".
(Italics added.)
The case involves simply the question of whether
defendant has paid all of the rentals it was obligated by
the lease to pay, or if it owes additional rentals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to the lease itself, other factual matters
were developed in tho trial relating to the matter in
issue. We state them briefly.
In what was designated a pro-trial order, the parties
stipulated and agreed to certain facts, which stipulation,
and facts embodied therein, was formally offered in
evidence by Plaintiffs and received by the Court:
1. That the dollar volume of sales made by the defendant from the premises during the ten years of the
lease was $1,300,926.56 ( H-020).
2. That tho dollar volume of sales made and effected
by the sub-lessee of the shoe department during the ten
years of the lease was $822,620.09 (R-020).
3. That the dollar volume of sales made and effected
by the sub-lessee of the millin.ery department was $131,330.73 (R-021).

4. That during the ten year term of the lease the
defendant paid as rentals $'10,37 4.64, and tendered the
additional sum of $211.80, which latter amount plaintiffs
refused to accept. ( R-021)
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5. The pre-trial order then contained the following
stipulation of the parties:

"That except as to the facts hereinabove
stipulated in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5, supra,
(being the matters set out in paragraph 1, 2, 3
and 4 above) the plaintiffs and defendants each
reserve, without prejudice or qualification of any
kind, the right to tender, offer and give evidence
on any issue * * * ".
Defendant at the time of the execution of the lease
was in the business of selling women's coats, suits, furs,
and dresses. This appears from the lease itself. Its
total sales for the period in question were $1,300,926.57.
Defendant sub-let space in the premises to a sub-lessee
who sold shoes, and whose total sales were $822,620.09.
It also sub-let space in the premises to a sub-lessee who
sold millinery, and whose total sales were $131,330.73.
Defendant paid rentals on the basis of its own
sales. These payments were accepted by the plaintiffs
up through the final month of the lease, but when the
final percentage rentals for the period from January
1st to February 15, 1~)49, amounting to $211.80 wer.e
tendered, plaintiffs refused the same, and brought this
action, claiming defendant should have been paying on
the basis of the sales of its sub-lessees, as well as
its own sales, and owed an additional $28,880.73 as percentage rentals on such sales.
On the trial, in addition to the foregoing facts.
plaintiffs proved by letters from defendant to plaintiffs
that on May 21. 1945, defendant paid the accrued percentage rentals on the sales of "Wrights, Inc." up
4

through December 31, 1944. (Flxhibit D.) Similar letters accompanied the checks for the percentage rentals
for the years 1946, 1946, 1947 and 1948. (Exhibits E, F,
G. H, and I). In each it was made clear by defendant
that the percPutage rentals paid were computed on the
basis of defendant's sale~; only.
Plaintiffs also offered to prove in effect that by
reason of the mannn in which the sales by the sublessees were handled they should be construed by the
court to be sales by the t1efendant itself. This offer
was refused. The basis of snch refusal, and the correctness of the ruling, ~will be considered infra.
At the conclusion of plaintiffs' evidence the defendant moved for a non-suit upon the ground that plaintiffs
had failed to prove that defendant owed additional rentals as claimed by plaintiffs, which motion was granted.
Plaintiffs' appeal apparently is predicated upon
two propositions,
First, that under the lease defendant was obligated
to pay percentage rentals on the basis of sales by its
sub-lessees. as well as its own sales, and,
Second, the lower court nrred in refusing plaintiffs'
offer of proof as to the manner aud methods of handling
the sales by the sub-lessees.
We will discuss these points in reverse order.
ARGDfllljJNT
THE LO\VI~R COUR1' IHD NO'r ERR IN REFUSING
PLAIN'l'IB'FS' CH'Fl<~R O:U' PROOF,
(A) BECA USJ1~ I'r \VAS IN DIRECT CONFLICT
WlTH 'l'HE STlPULA'l'ED ]'ACTS, AND
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(B) THE JDVIDJDNCE OFFERED vVAS WHOLLY DIMArrERIAL.
Plaintiffs offered to prove, in effect, that by reason
of the manner in which the sub-lessees conducted their
operations, their sales should be construed to be sales
by Wrights, Incorporated. We submit the lower court
was right in refusing this offer, first, because it was in
direct conflict with the stipulated facts, and, second
the evidence offered was wholly immaterial.

A. THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' OFFER OF PROOF,
BECAUSE IT WAS IN DIRECT CONFLICT
WITH 1'HE STIPULATED ]~ACTS.
As previously pointed out, the parties in the pretrial order stipulated and agreed as to the dollar volume
of defendant's sales. Paragraph 2 of such order and
stipulation recited ''That without further proof or
evidence and for the purpose of this action the volume
of sales by defendant from the premises under lease to
it" is $1,300,926.57. By Paragraph 6 it was stipulated in
effect that such was accepted as the fact, and evidence
to the contrary would not be tendered or offered. Yet
plaintiffs' offer of proof went to the heart of that very
stipulated fact, namely, that the sales by defendant were
not $1,300,92G.57, as agreed upon, but were something
other and different.
The effectiveness awl conclusiveness of stipulations
entered into between parties to litigation reg·arding
factual matters involved has been before the courts on
many occasions. The law seems to be well settled that
stipulations made by pal'ties to a judicial proceeding,
6

or by their attorneys, nrc binding upon those who make
them aud those whom the.'' lawfully represent. and also
upou the trial aml appellate courts. They cannot be
contradicted by evidence~ tending to show the facts to be
otherwise. 'l'his court ~:;o held in tho case of Rickenberg
u. Capital CJarar;e, G8 Utah 30, 249 P. 121, as follows:
"In this connectiou it should be stated that
respondent's counsel insist that the latter was
not guilty of driving the car at the time of his
arrest, but assert that the same was driven by a
lad about 13 years of age. They have set forth
the evidence upon that s11.bject and it supports
their contention. We remark. a complete answer
to the foregoing conteution is that it was stipulated at the hearing in tho court below, and the
stipulation appears in the record, that the re~:;pondent was convicted of the offense of driving
an automobile while intoxicated. Respondent is
bound by that stipulation, and so are we."
We point out particularly that in such a case, as
observed by the court, the evidence supported facts contrary to those stipulated, hut thi::; court said:
"Respondeut i::; bound by that stipulation,
and so are we.''
We recognize, of course, that in the interests of
justice parties to stipulated facts do not become irrevocably bound thereby. and may, under certain conditions, withdraw therefrom, or repudiate the same. The
rule with respect thereto appears to be well covered in
the decision of the Supremo Court of Nebraska in the
case of Lebarron v. City of Harvard, 2G2 N. W. 26, as
follows:
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"A stipulation by the parties as to the facts.
so long as it stands, is conclusive between them,
and cannot be contradicted by evidence tending
to show the facts otherwise. City of Chicago v.
Drexel, 141 Ill. 89,30 N. E. 774; Ward & Co. v.
Industrial Commission. 304 Ill. 576, 136 N. E.
796; 5 Wigmore, Evidence ( 2d Ed.) 605, Sec.
2590; Andrews v. Olaff, 99 Conn. 530, 122 A. 108.
Parties will not be relieved from stipulations
in the absence of a clear showing that the matter
stipulated is untrue. and then only if the application for such relief is seasonably made, and
good cause is shown for granting it. 25 R. C. L.
1099, Sec. 6; Smith v. Smith, 90 Fla. 824, 107 Sou.
257; Muller v. Dows. 94 U. S. 277, 24 L. FJd. 76;
United States v. Davidson (D. C.) 1 F. (2d) 465;
Brown v. Cohn, 88 Wis. 627, 60 N. W. 826; ]'ranklin v. National Ins. Co., 43 Mo. 491; Holley v.
Young, 68 Me. 215. 28 Am. Rep. 40; Hutchings
v. Buck, 32 Me. 277.
A motion addretlsed to the court for relief,
sustained by proper proof, with due notice to
opposing party, has been recognized as proper
practice. Ish. v. Crane, 13 0 hio St. 57 4; In re
Reed (D. C.) 117 F. 358. The opposing party
must be given due notice of the proposed application for relief. Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria
Iron Co., 185 U. S. 403, 22 S. Ct. 690. 46 L. Ed.
968.''
But even where proper application for leave to
repudiate a stipulation is made, relief therefrom lies in
the sound discretion of the trial court, which ordinarily
will not be interfered with on appeal. 50 Am. Jur. Pg.
613.
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So we say in the instant case that it having been
formally stipulated that the defendant's sales were in a
certain dollar amount, the proffered evidence tending to
show that sales by sub-lessees w~:::re in fact defendant's
sales, alHl thus defendant's sales were nearly a million
dollars greater than as stipulah~d, was properly refused.
B. THE LOW~JH COUHT DID NOT EHR IN REFUSING PLAINTIFFS' OFF]JR OF PROOF
Bl1JCAUSI1J 'rHE EVIDENCE OFFI1JRED WAS
vVHOLLY 11\lMA'rERIAL.
Tho second reason why the proffered evidence was
properly refused, is that the record discloses that such
evidence, going to the manner in which the sales were
handled, the relationship between defendant and the
sub-lesse(~S, employees, etc., was wholly immaterial.
After plaintiffs had made their offer of evidence which
they felt would tend to prove that what they had stipulated as being sub-lessees' sales were not such at all, but
were actually defendant's sales, the court inquired of
plain tiffs' attorney : ( R17)
''THE COUR'r: Let me ask this question, Mr.
Riter. Suppose these lessees had operated
entirely indepen.dent, they had no arrangement-say just for the purpose of the
argument-suppose they had operated entirely independent, had their own cash
register, had their own set up on everything, 'Would you still contend their sales
came under the terms of the lease?"
A.

''Yes, I would, under the terms of the lease,
quite frankly."
9

THE COURT: "Then with that, I'll sustain the
objection to the evidence, if that is your
contention.''
A.

"Why certainly I contend that."

THE COURT: "I'll sustain the objection."
In other words, plaintiffs made obvious their position to be that defendant was obligated to pay percentage rentals on the basis of the sub-lessees sales as such,
and, accordingly, it became immaterial under plaiutiff8'
own theory. and as the court was categorically informed,
as to the detail of the sub-letting, and the manner in
which the operations were carried on. Plaintiffs' theory
in effect was that defendant was liable on the basis of
all sales macle from the premises, whether its own sales,
or the sales of sub-lessees. Hence, the offered evidence
would not tend to establish any fact material to plaintiffs' case.
We appreciate, of course. that if plaintiffs' theory
was that defendant was liable only for its own sales,
evidence tending to show that all or some of what had
been referred to as snb-lessees' sales, were in fact defendant's sales, might be material, except that such evidence would be in direct conflict with the stipulated
facts. But plaintiffs adhered to the proposition that defendant was liable ou the basis of the sub-lessees' sales
as such, and the proffered evidence obviously was Immaterial.
This case was presented to the lower court upon
the theory that defeudant was liable to plaintiff under
the lease for percentage rentals based not only on its
own sales, but also on sales of the sub-lessees. Those
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figures were before the eourt, and stipulated and agreed
to by the parties. -With those figures before the court,
and with Mr. Riter's assertion to the court that defendant was liable for the sub-lessees' sales as such, the only
material quesiion -v:as the qnestion of law of whether
the lease, by its terms, covered, or should be construed
to cover, sales by snh-lPssees of lines of merchandise
1lOH-compeiitive -..vith defendant's, as well as defendant's, sales. Hence, the court's rejection of the proffered evidence was not erroneous. but proper.
The propositio1l may, perhaps, he stated in another
way. The issue. as stated by Mr. Riter, was, in effect,
that ddendnnt was liable on the basis of sub-lessees'
sales, as well as it own. Thus the question of whose sales
they may have been (so long as they were one or the
other) was not material. Material facts are those which
are essential io the case, and \Yithout which it could
not be supported. Evidence. to be admissable, may be
either faclLun probaudum, or factum probans, but it
must be one or the other. That is. it must tend to prove
either the ultimate issue, or a subsidiary fact which
itself temlF_; to prove the nltimaie issue. The proffered
evidence tended to prove neither, and hence its rejection was proper.

It is elementary. of course, that where a case is
tried on one theory in the court below, it may not be
presented 011 a differeui theory on appeal. Here plaintiffs were asked the direct ques)Lion by the court if they
contended that defendant was liable on the basis of the
sub-lessees' sales even if il1'~ sub-lessees operated "entirely independent'' of the defendant, and their reply
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to this direct qnestio11 was a categorical and unequivocal affirmative. In other words, their construction
of the rental provisiom; of the lease was that the lease
by its terms covered sales by independent sub-lessees.
Such being the case it is aplJarent that the proffered
tetimony was immaterial to the i::;sues as fixed by plaintiffs' own construction of the agreement, and they cannot now complain because the court made its evidentiary ruling in accord with plaintiffs' own construction
of the agreement.

THE LO\V J1~R COUR'I' Dl D NO 'I_' J~RR IN
GRAN1'1NG DEF£~NDANT'S MOr.I'JON FOR
NON-SUI'l', (A) BECAUSJ£ THI~ LEAS:BJ BY
ers 1<JXPHJ1JSS TJ<JRMS OBLIGA'l'B~D 'I_'HE
DEFENDANT TO PAY ON THE BASIS OF
ITS OvVN SALES ONLY, AND, (B) IF THERE
WAS ANY A~lBIGUI1'Y IN THE LEAS:B~ IN
REGARD 'l'O 1'H]J BASIS OF PAYMENT,
THF~ P ARr.I'UJS 'l'HEMSELVES CONSTRUED
IT IN FAVOR 01<, 'I_'HE- DEFENDANT.
At the conclusion of Plaintiff's case the Defendan'
moved for a judgment of non-suit. which was granted.
vVe submit this ruling was proper, (a) because the lease
by its terms obligated dofeudant to pay percentage
rentals on the basis of its own sales only, and the evidence conclusively showed that all such rentals had
been paid; and, (b) because if there was any ambiguity
in the lease in this regard. the parties themselves had
so construed it.

A. THE LEASE BY l'I_'S TERMS OBLIGAT:BJD
'l'HE DEFRNDAN'l' 'l'O PAY ON THE
BASIS OF l'l'S SAL:BJS ONLY.
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Referring again to the lease itself it will be noted
that the instrument first specifically defines the parties,
provided that this defendant, Wright's Incorporated,
is "hereinafter (in the lease) called the lessee". It
then goes on
''Awl said lessee ~, * * convenants to pay as
the annual rental for said premises three (3)
per cent of the total sales volume of the lessee,
provided. however, that the lessee agrees to pay
a miuimum rental of rr,,,o Thousand, Nine Hundred and Forty ( $2,940.00) Dollars per year * *
'~ . " (Italics added).
We submit that language could not be plainer,
phraseology could not be more specific, nor the intent
of the parties more clearly expressed. The language
of the \vritten lease is that percentage rentals are to
be based on the "sales volume of the lessee". But despite this clear and concise language these plaintiffs
(who are not the original lessors.) contend that there
is an ambiguity. and that the court should construe the
language ''sales volume of the lessee'' to read ''sales
volume of the lessee, plus the scLles volurnes of any sublessees''.
The parties to the lease in Paragraph 3 thereof,
specifically agreed
"That neither the lessee nor its legal representatives will let or underlet said premises,
or assign this lease without the written assent
of the lessor first had and obtained thereto, except that said lessee may sublet space in the
said premises to departments selling other lines
of merchandise thau those offered for sale by
the lessee that is to say women's coats, suits,
furs, and dresses''.
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The insertion of this provision in the lease completly stultifies any argument that the parties didn't
have in mind that sub-lessees might occupy portions
of the demised premises, because, after first inserting a blanket prohibition against sub-letting without
the lessor's assent, an exception to the prohibition was
agreed upon, and specific authority granted to defendant to sub-let portions of the premises to sub-lessees
who handled lines of merchandise non-competitive to
those handled by defendant.
The provision was in every respect a normal one,
and certainly not one to be viewed with suspicion, nor
even strictly construed; but one entitled to liberal
construction consonant with the obvious intent of the parties. The defendant at that time was engaged in the business of selling women's coats, suits, furs and dresses. We
must assume that both parties were interested in a long
term lease. Lessor wanted as rentals l% of the lessees' sale, but further vmnted to be protected to the
extent of minimum aunual rental of $2,940.00. In addition the parties further recongnized that by the adding
of additional lines of women's wear, non-competitive
with those handled by the defendant, defendant's sales
of its own merchandise might well be enhanced to the
benefit of both lessor and lessee. In other words, by
having sub-lessees haudling. as became the case, women's hats and shoes, customers who entered the premises for the purpose of buying hats or shoes became
immediately potential customers for coats, suits, furs
and dresses.
An examination of the sales figures representing
defendant's sales volume demonstrates the foresight
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of the parties in this connection. During 1939 (ten
and one half months) defendants sales were $43,952.12.
A full twelve months on this basis would have meant
total sales of $50,232.00. Six per cent of this figure is
roughly- $3,000.00 in rentals, approximating the $2,
But
940.00 minimum rental the lessor demanded.
note how the sales increased in succeeding years:
194(}_______________________________________________________ _ $ 57,044.05
75,984.43
1941·------------------------------------------------------1942 _______________________________________________________ _ 123.550.52
1943 _______________________________________________________ _ 177,184.01
1944 _______________________________________________________ _ 180,134.12
1945 _______________________________________________________ _ 188,732.61
1946 _______________________________________________________ _ 146,619,52
1947 _______________________________________________________ _ 142,655.38
1948 _______________________________________________________ _ 149.843.28

In other W?rds, from the low volume realized during the first year, defendant's sales increased to a peak
of $188,732.61 during the war year of 1945, and even
during the last full year of the lease amounted to approximately three times the sales volume of the first
year.
When thus analyzed, plaintiffs' entire argument
falls, and their authorities are demonstrated to be not
in point. This isn't a case where sub-letting authority
was used by the lessee to ''reduce'' rentals; or to
''diminish the rent''; or by ''changing the character
of the business"; or by failing to "conform to its previous methods''; or by effecting ''a change in the nature
of the business"; or "to dismember its business".
(Pages 24 to 33 of Plaintiffs' brim).
15

On the contrary, if the subletting had any effect
at all. it is obvious that it enhanced, rather than reduced, defendant's sales volume, to the distinct benefit,
rather than detriment, of the lessor and her daughters.
these plaintiffs. And so. whether the relationship that
the lessee bore to the lessor was sui generis, or quasifiduciary, as urged by plaintiffs, or simply the ordinary landlord and tenant relationship that we understand ordinarily exists under lease agreements. the defendant rendered to plaintiffs and to the lessor the full
measure of its responsibilities. The parties agreed
that the lessee might sub-let to sub-lessees handling
non-competitive lines. and it is not suggested that it
did more. The parties agreed that the percentage
rentals were to be paid on the basis of the defendant's
sales, and they were. Had the parties intended that
percentage rentals were to be paid by the lessee on the
sales by sub-lesse€s, a well as on its own, certainly they
would have so provided in the lease.
The lease is in no wise ambiguous. It fixes in clear
and concise language the basis upon which the per··
centage rentals were to be paid, namely, on the "total
sales volume of the lessee". To construe it to require
the lessee to pay rentals on some other basis is to do
violence to the plain language of the written instrument. and to the obvious intent of the parties thereto.
We submit that the applicable rule and the only
rule to be applied to this case is as set out in 17 C.
J. S. 695, as follows:
"The intention of the parties is to be deduced from the language employed by them, and
the terms of the contract, where unambiguous,
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pm<;i of mi:-.tn ke. t lw question heing, not what

i;.L·,,.;Ol! muy

h~tve

exisicd in tlw minds of the

parti(•;-',, fni'_ w11at lut()Jlliou is expressed by the·
hm~·uagu

used.

In eonstrning ~md determining the effect of a
\\r.itleu t(llli raet, the iutention of the parties
and tlw meaning are gathered primarily from
the eontenh; of the 1\Titing itself, or, as otherwise' stated. from the four con1ers of the iustrurneut nnd \Vheu :-:neh contract ]s clear alHl unequ~\·oual, ii::; me:millg· must be determined hy its
con tell ii-i alone; and a meaning cannot be given it
othc~r than that exprei-it:ed. Hence words cannot
be read into 11 contraet which import an intent
wholly uuexyJressecl wheu the coutraet was executed. \Vlwn' Uw contract evidencei'l care in its
preparation, it will he presumed that its words
werL' employed deliberately aml with intention .
.h;ach cmli met mnst be construed aceording
to its own term': u; h~nor, and the language em··
ployed must he: construed with reference to the
cou Lext awl io the facts of the particular case.
It is not Uw prov inee of the court to alter
a eontraet by co11strudion or to make a new
coutrael fur ih,e variimJ; its duty is confined
to the interpretation of tlw one which they have
made for themselves, and, in the absence of any
~TomHi 1'or dm1;·illg eu:i'orm~meut, to enforcing
or giviug cii'('C~ [o tl1c codraet as made, that is,
1o enforeu or give uiieeL to the contract as made
Y>iihout regard to iLc1 ,,-isdom or folly, to the
apparent wn·easmG~:leness of the terms, or to
ihe fact that ilw rights of t!w 1mrties are not
carefully guarded, as tlw couri cmmot supply
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material ::;tipulations or read into the contract
words which it doe:-; not contaiu so as to change
the meaniug of words contained iu the contract.''
In numerous lJtah decisions this rule ha:-:; l)eeu
applied and adhered to. ln the case of Middlctou 'I'.
Evans et al, 86 Utah 396, 45 P2d 570 is this stated:

"1t .is a well-established rule of law that
where the language of a contract is clear aud un'lmbiguous, it is the duty of the court to determine the iutent of the parties from the lauguage
used by the parties in the contract. \Vintle v.
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 73 Utah 215, 273
P. 312; Armstrong v. Larst>n, 55 Utah 347, 186
P. 97; Manti City Sav. Bank, v. Peterson, 3:1
Utah 209, 83 P. 566, 126 Am. St. Rep. 817."
And in Wiutle u. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, 73
Utah 215, 273 P. 312:

''It, of course, is conceded that it
of a court to determine the intent of
to a contract L·om the language used
tract, if such language .is clear and
ous.''

is the duty
the parties
in the conunambigu-

And in lJ;htrplty v. 8alt Lake City, 65 Utah 295, 236
P. 680:
''Contract,.; are prepared and entered into
for the com GHience and protection of the parties, aud nnles:; waived the courts are bound to
enforct~ them in accordance 'With the intention

as the same is mauifested by the language used
by the parties lo the contract."
And in Richards irrigation Company v. West view
Irrigation C. et al, 96 Lliall Jo:3, 80 P. 2d 458:
18

'' 'i'o this holding we cannot accede. Both
s:des in','Olw tho settled doctrine that when a
\\Titing i;,; eluar alHl plain on its face, not amh1gtWU;J or doubtful, there is uo room for consi~·J;eiion 1mt n~sort must he had to the langtm;~·p em]Jloyurl iu determining meaning or intention. 'fhu rule is a sound one and fully applicahlu to the disputed clauses in the agreement
here in question. 'I' he language employed is
uot doubtfnl or ambiguous; the meaning and
iutent are com;picuously clear and plain."
And iu First Natioual Bank of Salt Lake City v.
llaymon.cl et al, 89 Utah 151, 57 P. 2d 1401:

'' lllorever, to require the mortgagee to accept Uw mortgaged property iu lieu of the money
which the mortgagors have agreed to pay would
uc to 11Lake a contract fo·r tfte pa1'ties contrary
to their agreement.''
And iu the case of Jensen v. Kidman et al, 85
Utah 27. 38 P. 2cl ~)G:-:, this court quoted with approved
tho rule as stated in 13 C. J. 525:
"It is not the province of the court to alter
a contract by construction or to make a new
contract for the parties; its duty is confined to
tho interprdatiou of the one which they have
made for themselves, without regard to its wisdom or folly, as the court cannot supply material stipulations or n•ad into the contract words
which it does not contain.''

The rule so quoted by this court, in the case last
above cited, is of particular significanee, as it is the
contract of the original parties which is to be construed herein, and not some agreement which these plaintiffs. as successors to the original lessor, deem should
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have been made. Significant, indeed, is the fact that
the lessor herself, Allie C. Baker, never raised the
question now raised by these plaintiffs, awl it was
only after her death. in fact several years after these
plaintiffs succeeded to her interests, that any cmltention was made that rentals were not bei11g pai!l iu accord
with the provisions of the lease. But more about that
later.

B. ASSUMING THA'r 'rHE. RI;JNTAL PROVISIONS OF THE Ll<JASE ARE AMBIGUOUS, THE PARTIES THJ1JMSJ<JL YB~S
ADOPTED A CONS'rRUCTION 'rHERE011' WHICH MAY NOT BE ABROGA'rED.
The Plaintiffs have gone to considerable extent
m their brief in arguing applicable rules of construction where an ambiguity is found in a written instrument. Such rules have no relevancy, however, ~where
the language of the instrument, as here, is clear, consise and unequivocal. Bnt we now assume, for the purpose of the argumellt that despite such clear, concise
and unequivocal language, this court finds that an ambiguity does exist, and the terms of the lease reqnire
construction. What construction shall be given u? The
parties themselves have collstrued the lease as fixing defendant's obligation to pay percentage rentals on the
basis of its sales only, which construction by the parties we submit should not be disturbed. This is referred to by the authorities as the doctrine of '' practical construction''.
A general statement of the rule is to be found
in 12 Am. Jur., (Contracts), Section 249, Page 787. as
follows:
20

"In the determination of the meaning of
an indefinite or ambiguous contract, the interpretation placed upon the contract by the parties themselves is to be considered by the court
and is entitled to great. if not controlling, influence in ascertaining their understanding of
its terms. In fact the courts will generally follow such practical interpretation of a doubtful contract. It is to be assumed that parties
to a contract know best what was meant by its
terms and are the least likely to be mistaken as
to its intention; that each party is alert to protect his own interests and to insist on his rights;
and that whatever is done by the parties during the period of the performance of the contract
is done under its terms as they understood and
intended it should be. Parties are far less
likely to have been mistaken as to the meaning
of their contract during the period when they
are in harmony and practical interpretation reflects that meaning than when subsequent differences have impelled them to resort to law and
one of them seeks an interpretation at variance
with their practical interpretation of its provisions. Where the languag·e of a contract is uncertain and the parties thereto, by their subsequent acts and conducts, have shown that they
construed it alike and within the purview of
the constructions permitted as possible by such
language, the courts will ordinarily follow such
adopted construction as the correct one.
The facts in this case bring it squarely within the
above rule. The contract provided for the payment
by lessee of annual rental equivalent t~'-lJ%) per
cent of its total sales volume, but not less than $2.940.00.
It is apparent that for the years 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942,
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1943 and 194ci no percentage rentals were paid at the
conclusion of each respeetive year. hut only the hasie
annual reutal of *2,940.00. This appears from the
stipulation embodied iu the pre-trial order whereiu
it is reflected that the first percentagp rentals oye1·
and above the lnu:;ic reutals were paid 011 May 21, 1943,
and covered the additional rentals predicated on tlw
percentage basiC)! for the years 1D:-lD through 1!KL 'rlw
amount of this payment on J\Iay 21, 1D-J-3, was in tlw
amount of $3.997.08. (Par. 5 (b) of Pre-'1\·ial Order,
R. - 021).

Why the additional rentals computed on the
percentage basis for each of the years 1D3D through
1943 had not previously been paid, is uot made to appear, hut in any event. at the conclusion of the year
1944 this over-sight was rectified by the payment ou
May 21, 1945, of all accruals through 1D44. aml the
payment of such accurals, based onJJ% of the defeudant's sales o1tly, was Hceeptctl Ly these plaintiffs. r:rhis
is reflected by Plaintiffs' l<Jxhibit "D" Leiug a letter
from the defendant io Uw plaintiffs which accompanied
defendant's check for the additional percentage rentals
for the period 1:)3~) through 1944 in the amount of $3.
997.08. 'l'he letter is as follows:

WRlUH'l''S INCORPORATED
\Vomen 's Appanel and Accessories
Ogden, Utah
New York Office
450 Seventh Ave.
Chicago Office
222 West Adams St.
May 21, 1945
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!\Irs. IDtha B. Flowers
!\Irs. Aura B. Horton
l\[n.;. TuliP B. Rall<lall
:2~06 Lilleoln Avenue
Ogdell, Utah
[)('ar i\1 a dames:
11'ollowing is a snmmary of the sales of "Wright's
Tllc." for the period ended December 1944.
Total sales $661,23fi.OO
() l' the total sales the lease proYides the lessor

shall recc~iYe three per cent, aeeonlingly. A
total rental clue for the period is $19,837.08
Lcsll nmtals paid, G years at $2,940.00 15,840.00
Adclitioual rental dne $3,997.08.
Accordingly our check iu this amount is enclosed.
_Made payable to the three heirs indicated above.
Yours very truly
WRIGHT'S INCORPORATED
By C. A. ·wRIGHT, President
CAW;ml
Thus it is apparent that ill 1945, when the
computation of reutals 011 the percentage basis
made, that these ~laintiffs lmew that defendant
computing them on the basi::; of its sales only, and
plaintiffs accepted the rentals ou that basis.

first
was
was
that

Now let's see what happem~d in succeeding years.
On January 14, 1946, defenda11 t sent plaiutiff its check
in the amount of $2,721.97, representing the difference
between three (3%) per cent of its sales for the year
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1945, and the lmsic l'Pllt:ll of $2,940.00 for that year. A
letter accompanied sneh payment (Plaintiffs' Exhibit
"E ") as follows:

.January 14, 194G
J\Irs. J1Jtlw B. F'l(nvers
l\rrs. Aura B. Horton
J\Irs. Tulie B. Hall(lall
220G Lincoln A vPnue
Ogden, Utah
Dear Maclames :
FollmYing is a summary of the sales of "\Vrig-ht's
Inc.'' for the periorl ending December of 19-±5.
l'lw toial sales is $188,732.60.
01' tlw total sale;' the lease provides the lessor
shall receive three per cent, accordingly. A total
rental dne for the period is
$5,GG1.m
Less rentals paid for one year
AdditiomJ rental clue

2.9-:10.00
$2,72UJ7

Aceordingly onr check in this amouni is cmclosed.
Made payahL• to the three heirs indicated above.
Sincen•ly yours
\VHIGII'l' 'S INCORPORATED

By II. L. Yeagc•rs, Vice President
HLY: ml
Now as to lr>-Hi. U appears from l'aragmph 5
(d) of the stipulatio1J c·m!JOdied ill the Pre-trial Order
that on February J 7, HJr.-. dufendant paid io plaintiffs
$1,358.59, m; aclditi(jld \ll'i '''<'llta:.;;e rentals due for 19-:16.
l'he letter, if auy, wliie" ~~u·ompanied this payment is
not in evidence, hut ou Febnwry 20, 1947, apparently
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in respons€ to some inquiry by one of the plaintiffs,
defendant wrote to Etha B. Flowers, one of the plaintiffs, a letter received in evidence as Plaintiffs' Exhibit '' F' '. which opened with the following statement:
"Pursuant to your telephone call I have
examined the record of sales and payments at
Wright's Incorporated and find as follows:
Then followed some detail with resp€ct to sales
figures, but the significant factor is that it was tied
specifically to sales by the defendant.
On January 27 1948, defendant paid to plaintiffs
as additional percentage rentals for the year 1947, the
sum of $1341.70. rrhis payment was accompanied by
a letter from defendant, as follows:
WRIGHT'S INCORPORATED
Women's Apparel and Accessories
Ogden. Utah
Chicago Office
222 West Adams St.

New York Office
450 Seventh Ave.
January 27, 1948

Mrs. Etha B. Flowers
1378 Marilyn Drive
Ogden, Utah
Dear Mrs. Flowers :
Enclosed is the summary of the totals for
the year of 1947.
Total Sales year 194 7
3% of above
Rent Paid 194 7
Balance
25

$142,723.21
4,281.70
2,940.00
$ 1.341.70

Enclosed is the check for the balance.
Yours very truly,
H. L. Yeager
Vice President
On January 31, 1949, defendant made a payment
to plaintiffs in the amount of $1,555.30 as the additional
percentage rentals for the year 1948. This payment
was accompanied by defendant's letter as follows:
January 31, 1949
Mrs. Etha B. Flowers
1378 Marilyn Drive
Ogden. Utah
Dear Mrs. Flowers:
Following is a report of the sales of Wright's
Inc. for the period ended December 31, 1948:
Gross Sales

$149,843.28

Rent Computed at 3%

4,495.30

Less Rents paid 12 months (a)
$245.

2,940.00

Balance Rent Due

$ 1,555.30

Accordingly our check for the balance due
is enclosed.
Yours truly.
WRIGHT'S INC.
C. A. Wright
President
CW:me
Encl - 1
Bear in mind that when this payment was made
and this letter written, it was just fifteen days before
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the expiration of the terrn of the lease, and represented
payment in full for the last full year of the lease. This
letter, as the previous ones did, made plain that the payment was predicated on the basis of 3% of defendant's sales only. As in the case of previous payments,
this paymeut ou that basis was accepted without question by the plaintiffs.
We submit that these several payments. and the
several letters which accompanied the percentage rental checks established beyond doubt that defendant construed its obligation to plaintiffs to be the payment of
percentage rental on the basis of its sales, and not on
the basis of its sales plus sub-lessees' sales, and that
plaintiffs, by accepting payments on that basis, knowing such to be the construction placed on the lease by
defendant, acquiesced therein. and cannot now be heard
to say that some other construction should be adopted.

A review of a few of the decisions should serve to
illustrate the point.
The case of Chick et al v. MacBain, (Va) 160 S. E.
214, involved the rental clause of a lease. The court
said:
"We are further of opinion that the language
in clause 11 of the lease, supra, is ambiguous.
and that when the original term provided for by
the lease expired and appellants paid the rent
pursuaut to the provisions of the lease, as construed by them, and without protest appellee accepted the payments for a period of three months,
he acquiesced in the coustruction that appellants
were to pay the sum of $235 per month for the
first thirty months of the second term of five
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years and $275 per month for the last thirty
months of the second term. It is a well-recognized principle of law that, when a written instrument is capable of more than one construction, then the courts will g-ive to it that construction which the parties themselves have
placed upon it. This is known as "the doctrine
of practical construction.''
In Holland v. Vaughan, 120 Va. 328, 91 S. E.
122, 124, Chief Justice Prentis said: "No rule
for the construction of written instruments is
better settled than that which attaches great
weight to the construction put upon the instrument by the parties themselves. * * *"
In Chesapeak & Potomac 'rel. Co. v. Wythe
1\Iut. Tel. Co .. 142 Va. 540, 129 S. E. 389, the rule
stated in the Holland Case was applied. It is
true that in the Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.
Case the period of acquiescence extended over
three years. The period of time, however, is not
the criterion. The test comes when a party to
the contract is asserting a right under the contract as he conceives it. If the other party to
the catttract contro-verts the assertion of the right,
he should do so immediately.
Under a proviso in the lease the lessor was
given the option of changing the terms of the
lease by giving six months' notice to such intention. No such notice was given.
In view of the fact that no notice was given
that appellee would contend that the future rental
would be at the rate of $275 per month, and in
view of the further fact that appellants relied
for a period of three months upon their construction of the co11tract that the rental should be at
the rate of $235 per month for the first thirtv
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months, without protest upon the part of the appellee, it is a fair assumption that all parties to
the contract placed the same construction upon
it."
We deem it sufficient to add to the foregoing what
we believe to be the latest pronouncement by this court
on the subject. In Trucker Sales Corpomtion v. Potter,
104 Utah, 137 P. (2) 370, it is held:
''On the other hand, the court's construction
is that given the contract by the parties themselves. From October 1, 1938. when the contract
was entered into, until August, 1941, almost three
years, the partnership furnished plaintiff with
duplicate slips and paid without question plaintiff's commission on all coal sold. Appellants
first raised this question on October 6. 1941.
Nothing could show the intention of the parties
more clearly than the interpretation they them·
selves placed upon a contract. It is well settled
in this state that where the parties to a contract,
with full knowledge of the terms thereof, by their
actions before any controversy has arisen, place
upon it a construction which is not contrary to
the usual meaning of the language used the courts
will follow that construction. Fowers v. Lawson,
56 Utah 420, 191 P. 227; Roberts v. Tuttle. 36
Utah 614, 105 P. 916; Titton v. Sterling Coal &
Coke Co., 28 Utah 173, 77 P. 758; 107 Am. St.
Rep. 689; Snyder v. Fidelity Savings Association,
23 Utah 291. 64 P. 870; Woodward v. Edmonds,
20 Utah 118, 57 P. 858; Peay v. Salt Lake City,
11 Utah 331, 40 P. 206.
In the instant case the defendant at all times construed the lease as requiring it to pay rental on the
basis of its sales only, and it did so pay. With each
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payment of percentage rentals the plaintiffs wPre advised that the payment was on that basis. Plaintiffs
accepted the payments so computed, evou up to aml including those for the final year of the lPase. withcwt
protest or objectiou of any kind. We sumbit that under
such circumstances, and at the conclusion of tho touancy,
plaintiffs may not now contend it to have been the intention of their predecessor and this defemlant that pay·
ment was to have been on some other basis.
Assuming, therefor, for the sake of tho argument,
that the provisions of the lease relating to rental payments are ambiguous. such provisions have been c;onstrued by the parties themselves as fixing rentals ou
the basis of defendant's sales only, and that construction,
under the decisions of this court, is now final.
It may not be amiss at this point to observe that i1;
the construction of lease agreements, as contra di:3tinguished from contracts generally, a rule of construction of ambiguities against the lessor and in favor or
the lessee, has beeu adopted. This rule of construction
springs from the fact that a lease is regarded as a grant
of the lessor, and so should be construed most strongly
against him. Like all rules of construction, other factors
may supply modifying effects, but the rule does have
its place where lease agreements are under consideration. In the case of Anderson v. Ferguson, (Wash.j
135 P. (2) 302, the rule is thus expressed:

''The convenant is at least capable of two
constructions, but any ambiguity therein must be
resolved in favor of the lessees, for it is well
settled that where a lease is capable of more than
one construction, tho courts will adopt that con30

struction which is most favorable to the lessee.
Salzer v. Manfredi, 114 Wash. 666,195 P.1046;
Dicttrich v. J. ,J. Newberry Co., 172 Wash. 18. 19
P. 2d 115; National Bank of Commerce of Seattle
v. Dunn, 194 Wash. 472, 78 P. 2d 535; Murray v.
Odman, 1 Wash. 2d 481, 96 P. 2d 489.
In Teeter v. Mid- West Enterprise Co. (Okla.) 52 P.
(::l) 810. thus:
"It is a well-settled rule of law that where a
provision in a lease contract is ambiguous, and
where there is no evidence to the contrary as to
the intention of the parties, it should be construed
against the lessors and in favor of the lessees.
Salzer v. Manfredi, 114 Wash. 666, 195 P. 1046;
Pierce et al v. N cw York Dock Co. ( C.C.A.) 265
F. 148; Goldberg v. Pearl, 306 Ill. 436. 138 N. E.
141; 507 Madison Avenue Realty Co., Inc., v.
Martin, 114 1\Iisc. 315, 187 N.Y.S. 318; and Williams v. N otopolis. 259 PPa. 469, 103 A. 290.

In Bah v. Pan A'tnerican Petrolenrn Corporation
(La) 37 F. Supp., 785, thus:
''In any event the most that can be said is
that the language of the lease is of doubtful meaning and as was said in a syllabus in the case of
Murrell v. Lion, 30 La. Ann. 255, which was cited
with approval in the case of Martin v. Martin,
La. App. 181 So. 63: "Any doubt as to the intentions of the parties to a contract of lease. arising out of uncertain terms of the contract, will be
construed in favor of the lessee. It is the business
of the lessor to have the agreement expressed in
clear and certain terms.''
In The11unissen et al v. Huyler's, Inc. 25 F. (2) 530,
thus:
"Plaintiffs concede that 'it has long been
settled law that in the case of a lease or other
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written instrument of grant, the document is to
be construed most strongly in favor of the grantee
or lessee,' and such is the law.''
APPF~LLANT 'S

CASES

Plaintiffs cite a number of decisions of other courts
relating to percentage rental agreements in support of
their appeal. We desire to comment briefly thereon.
because we believe that an examination thereof discloses either that they are not in point at all, or that
they support defendant's position, rather than plaintiffs'.
First, however, we should observe that if other decisions relating to other lease agreements are to be
turned to it must be, ( 1) on the premise that this leo f:i~'
is ambiguous. and so should be construed in accord w1th
constructions placed on other ambiguous documeuL:
without regard to the construction the parties themselves
placed thereon, (which, as \Ye have shown, is at variance
with Utah law); or (2) on the premise the parties could
not lawfully contract as they did, and the court should
construe the instrument as it feels the parties should
have written it. The first we have already discussed
and demonstrated its lack of merit. Further. the danger
to be encountered in attempting to apply formulas tu
the construction of contracts which are clear and unambiguous is appareut. These dangers were recognized
by the Court of Appeals of New York in the case of
Brown v. Bedell, et al, 188 N. E. 641 in the following
language:
"The court should be solicitous to gather the
object and purposc:s of the parties from the laug·
uage of their contract rather than from formulas
applied to other cases.''
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The second premise is untenable on its face. These
parties were free to contract as they saw fit. The lessor
could have given the defendant occupancy rent free had
she seen fit. She could have charged a flat rental, or
she could, as she did, combine a basic rental with a percentage of defendant's sales. She might. had she seen
fit, tied the percentage rentals into all sales from the
premises, which would have included sales by sublessees, or she might have based the percentage rentals
on all of defendant's receipts from the premises, which
would have included rentals received by defendant from
sub-lessees, but not their sales. Or she might. as she
did, elect to fix the rentals on the basis of defendant 'B
sales, without regard to other receipts by defendant, or
sales by sub-lessees. W c submit that in so doing she
did nothing immoral, or unlawful. or contrary to public
policy. She herself was satisfied with her lease and with
the anticipated rentals thereunder. While her daughters
may not now be satisfied with the lease as she made it,
such dissatisfaction certainly is no basis for abrogating
it.
Now to plaintiffs' case relating to percentage rental
agTeements. The first one cited is that of Garden Suburbs Golf & Couutn; Club u. Pr-uitt (Fla.) 24 So. (2)
989. The excerpt quoted therefrom by plaintiffs appears at Page 21 of their brief, and is as follows:
''A percentage lease permitting the lessee
to sublet portions of the premises, or concessions,
or privileges therein, does not permit the lessee
to deprive the lessor of a percentage of the gross
receipts which would accrue from main revenueproducing facilities. In other words, this subleasing authority cannot be used to reduce the
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percentage rental which would ordinarily accnte
to the lessor from the revenue-producing facilitieJ
ordinarily operated by the lessees." (Italics
ours)
The final sentence of the quotation contains the key,
and discloses its inapplicability to the facts of the instant case. Here the sub-lessees did not operate facilities "ordinarily operated by the lessee", and so conlc!
not "reduce the percentage rental which would ordinarily accrue to the lessor."
In Cissna Loan Co. v. Barron, (Wash.) 270 P. 1022
(Page 25 of Plaintiffs' brief), the percentage rentals
were based on the gross sales of the department ston·
business conducted in the building. The lessee moved
two important departments into adjoining premises. aud
thus sought to avoid payment of rentals on sales therefrom. As pointed out by plaintiffs, the Washington
court refused to approve such a course of conduct as
would have the effect of reducing the rentals "whjc],
would ordinarily accrue to the lessor". That again is a
far cry from the principle of this case, where the lessee,
instead of reducing its sales. enhanced them greatly by
subletting for sales of merchandise non-competitive
with its own.
The rule announced by the New Jersey Court in the
case of S. P. Du11ham Co. v. East State Street Development Co., 35 A (2) 40. 49, (Pages 26 and 27 of Plaintiffs'
brief), is likewise not in point. That rule is as follows:
"The construction of the provisions of the
lease here expressed is not to be understood to
condone the removal by the claimant of its most
lucrative and remunerative departments from the
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aemised premises to other premises in the endeavor to diminish the rent to which the defendant is justly entitled under the covenants of the
lease.

In Selber Bros. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores (La.\
194 So. 579, the lessee changed the character of its business from that of a high class shoe store to that of a low
order of business, consisting of continuous close out
sales, cheap brands of shoes, etc. This case obviously
is not in point.
The significance of the cited case of JJfayfair Operat·
ing Corp. v. Besse-mer Properties (Fla.) 7 So. (2) 342,
(Page 29 of Plaintiffs' Brief), is not apparent to us, aE~
it appears not to be in point at all. However, at Page
30 of the brief is a statement we cannot permit to go
unchallenged.
Plaintiffs there argue that the parties to this lease
contemplated the defendant would sell "female weari11i:!
apparel and all accessories and accouterments." This
we categorically deny, as by the terms of the lease the
defendant at most was obligated to continue its thPn
operations of selling \vomen 's coats, suits, furs and
dresses. As to other "accessm·ies and accouterments"
it was given carte blanche sub-letting authority.
Next follows a clisserta tion on the meaning of total
sales, and the distinction between sub-lessees as such and
sub-lessees of space. As to the meaning of total sales,
we have no quarrel, so long as it is confined to defendant's sales, as the lease confines it. We do deny, however, that the language of the lease ''total sales of the
lessee" may be extended to include sales by persons
other than the lessee, without doing violence to the
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obvious intentions of those who themselves chose thr)
language used. Further \Ve do not agree with plaintiffs'
assertion (Page 36 of their brief) that the words "total
sales volume of the lessee" possess such "au all inclusive quality. without limitations" as to bring in sales
of anyone but the lessee.
As to the distinction attempted between ''sublessees" and "sub-lessees of space", we confess to
losing ourselves. Apparently, however. plaintiffs contend that inasmuch as the sublessees were "sublessees of
space" they in fact were not sub-lessees at all, and
hence their sales are not sales by sub-lessees, but in
fact sales by the defendant.
Of course the first answer to this is the stipulation
of facts hereinbefore referred to. In such stipulation
the sales are specifically distinguished-defendant's
sales being agreed as being in the amount of $1,300,926.57; the sales of the sub-lessee selling shoes being $822.620.09; and the sales of the sub-lessee selling millinery
being $131,330.73. What the argument seeks to do is
to repudiate such stipulation, and throw the sales of the
sub-lessees into the category of sales by the defendant.
Further than that, hovvever, we cannot conceive that
this court will consent to a violation of the obvious intent of the parties to the lease, as specifically expressed
in their written agreement. by holding that the subletting authority was in fact no such authority at all.
The words seized upon by plaintiffs, in this phase
of their argument, appear to be the phrase in the lease
that the lessee might ''sublet space in the said premises''
for sales of non-competitive lines of merchandise, which
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follows as an exception to the provisiOn that the sublessee may not sublet without the lessor's consent. The
entire paragraph of the lease reads as follows:
"That neither the ]essee nor its legal representative will let or sublet said premises or
assign this lease, without the written consent of
the lessor first had and obtained, except that said
lessee may sublet space in the said premises to
departments selling other lines of merchandise
than those offered for sale by the lessee; that is
to say. women's coats, suits, furs, and dresses.':
From this proviBion of the lease plaintiffs make
what is to us the anomalous argument,
u The parties clearly intended that the defendant could not place a sub-tenant in the de·
mised pretnises, whether that sub-tenant occupied
all of the premises or only a part thereof." (Bottom of Page 30 of Plaintiffs' Brief).

How that conclusion can be draw from the foregoing
language of the lease is beyond us. Plaintiffs explain
it by saying that as there is a prohibition against subletting generally, with an exception only in favor of
sub-lessees of space in the premises, a sub-lessee of
space is not a sub-lessee of any portion of the premises.
Or to be concrete, one who might sublet the space constituting the rear one-half of the premises. with the right
to occupy and use such space, is actually not sub-letting
anything. To this we pose the question, what then can
constitute a sub-letting? All the lessee had to sub-let
was space. Certainly a sub-tenant would not be interested in sub-letting any portion of the building itself,
as contra-distinguished from space in the building. vVe
submit that it is obvious that the parties to this leasE',
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in using the phraseology they did, used words in tlwir
ordinary sense. and in providing that the lessee might
sub-let space in the premises for sales of non-compe6tiT\~
lines of merchandise, intended just that, and con templated that any such sub-letting would constitute the sublessee a sub-tenant.
To hold otherwise is to attribute to the parties the
senselessness of i11serting in the lease a meaningless provision. To construe the general prohibition against subletting as being all controlling is to render wholly ineffective the exception. If, as contended by plaintiffs,
the lessee could not sub-let, but only operate separate
departments under its own direction and control. and
which constituted a part of lessee's business as a whole
(page 33 of Plaintiffs' Brief), the exception to the general prohibition is meaningless. In other words, if all
lessee could do was to install new departments and
operate them itself as a portion of its over all operations, then the provision
''except that said lessee may sublet space in the
said premises to departments selling other lines
of merchandise than those offered for sale by the
lessee, that is to say, \vomen's coats. suits, furs
and dresses.''
is wholly meaningless, because there is certainly nothing
in the general prohibi~ion against sub-letting to preclude
the lessee from enlarging its own operations at will. This
excepting clause was obviously inserted to the end of
modifying the geueral prohibition against sub-letting
without lessor's conr,;ent, and constituted authority to
defendant to sub-let without first obtaining permission,
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where sales of non-competitive merchandise were concerned. To hold that it was written into the lease solely
for the purpose
''of permitting the operation by others of departments under defendants' control.'' (Page 31
of Plaintiffs' Brief)
is to say that the lessee had no such authority but for
the proviso. But the general prohibition is directed
wholly against sub-letting. not against the enlargement
of defendant's operations, and thus, if so construed,
renders entirely meaningless the excepting clause. As
pointed out by this court in the case of Powerline Company v. Russell's Inc. 103 Utah 441, 135 P. (2) 906,
''When possible the court should give effect to
all words and clauses of the lease and construe
the lease as a whole.''
The only \Yay in which this excepting clause can be
given any effect or meaning whatever is to attribute
to it the effect of modifying the clause containing the
general prohibition against sub-letting. and when so construed its effect is to permit a sub-letting of space in
the leased premises to persons selling lines of merchandise not sold by defendant.
As pointed out by this court in the case of Vitagraph
Inc. v. American Theatre Co. 77 Utah 71, 291 P. 303:
"Taking its words in their ordinary and
usual meaning, no substantive clause must be
allowed to perish by construction, unless insurmountable obstacles stand in the way of any other
course. Seeming contradictions must be harmonized if that course is reasonably possible.
Each of its provisions must be considered in connection with the others, and, if possible, effect
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must be given to all. A construction which entirely neutralizes one provision should not be
adopted if the contract is susceptible of another
which gives effect to all of its provisions."
And in Ed. of Ed. of Salt Lake City v. Wright-Osborn Co., 49 Utah 453) 164 P. 1033, it is said:
"It is a cardinal rule of construction that all
the words used by the parties must. if possible,
be given their usual and ordinary meaning and
effect. It 'vill not be assumed that the parties to
the contract did not intend what their language
implies.''

Also Bonneville Lumber Co. v. J. G. Peppard Seed
Co., 72 Utah 463, 271 P. 226:

''It is a cardinal rule of construction, and
the first to be applied whenever construction becomes necessary, that, unless technical terms are
used. the language must be given its plain, ordinary, and obvious meaning.''

CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit, that all rulings of the lower
court upon the trial of this action were proper and correct. That with respect to plaintiffs' proffered evidence
the court was correct in rejecting it.
First, because it was directed toward the proof of
facts in direct conflict with the written stipulation of the
parties fixing the dollar amount of defendant's sales,
and establishing that there were in fact sub- lessees having substantial sales of their own; such stipulation
specifically reciting that the facts therein agreed upon
were ''for the purpose of this action''; and
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Second. because by plaintiffs own statement in open
court to the effect that defendant was liable regardless
of whose sales they were, the proffered evidence was
immaterial.
That with respect to the lower court's granting·
defendant's motion for non-suit, such ruling was correct
and proper,
First, because the lease by its specific and unambiguous terms fixed the liability of the defendant to
pay rentals on the basis of its own sales only, and it
was agreed that all such rentals had been paid; and
Second. the parties themselves, throughout the entire term of the lease, had paid and accepted rentals
based on defendant's sales only, which constituted a
practical construction of the rental provisions of the
lease, and one to be adopted and accepted by the court.
Respectfully submitted,

HOWELL, S'riNE & OLMSTEAD.
Attorneys for Defeudant and Respondent
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